Just finished my talk on browser insecurity for the Calgary ISACA chapter. Thank you to those who attended. The intention of the topic isn't to scare people, but to help inform those that only hear from vendor's regularly regarding the state of their controls.
Here is a link to the presentation in both pdf (with speaking notes) and the ppt formats.
While there are a lot of new posts regarding the new ways to exploit people using novel techniques and 0day exploits, there continues to be a rash of tried and true methods of coercion. I want to just walk through a simple example and reflect on how effective these methods continue to be. Many people turn toward online classified sites to buy and sell items online. This example starts with kijiji.ca which even I've used on occasion to find used electronics and other items. Doing a search on the site for a " Samsung Galaxy Note 2 " returns a posting from today with someone selling one for an unreasonably priced unit. $125 for a $500 phone?, but what if it's for real? No harm in just asking some simple questions. Email sent with some obvious questions regarding the condition and location. About an hour passes before I get a response from what appears to be a legit seller. Notice no answer to the questions I asked, but a friendly pointer at where th
All the press regarding the new Touch ID fingerprint biometric on Apple's new iPhone has brought some insight into how to misuse this service. Most of the critics have focused on circumventing the device to gain access or Apple deciding to share the data with the Government. One interesting perspective that I haven't seen covered yet is if the system could be used as a distributed matching system for existing fingerprint image systems. In an over simplified view of the process, a law enforcement agency can take an acquired fingerprint and search for patterns in the database of collected prints and spit out possible matches. Although Apple states that an API won't be available for apps, it is conceivable that such an interface might exist, and provide the ability to take an acquired print (either from the iPhone hardware or from software) and check it for validity against the stored print. There are some limits to this, as there is likely only going to be one prin
Since the latest major OpenSSL vulnerability was publicly disclosed, many people and organizations are scrambling to understand, respond and prepare themselves for the future. Twitter, vendor support channels and media outlets have been quick to cover different angles of the issue but there has been overwhelming amount of information released. With all this information, it can be difficult to understand what's relevant. To help clarify we holding a special ISACA sponsored 2-hour session on Wednesday, April 16th, starting at 12:00pm at the Royal Glenora Club. Benoit and I will be attempting to explain as much of the issue as we can from a technical and non-technical perspective, discussing the vulnerability, its scope with relation to our personal and professional lives and other related concerns such as our trust in the public PKI system. The second hour we will be an interactive discussion about how others are dealing with problem, questions about related topics,