Monday, December 5

Creating an Encrypted Bootable OSX Lion USB Recovery Disk

With Apple's latest operating system release 10.7 - Lion they have included a number of new features which make it a bit more convenient to both backup and secure your data in case of a failure.  In this short post I'll explain how to use a generic external drive to make a secure bootable disk for your mac.

First a disclaimer and some assumptions regarding your setup.  I have used these instructions to get a working disk on my setup - but this does not mean that the same steps will work for you, so use caution - and if anything goes wrong please feel free to add to these steps.

I am also assuming that you are using the latest operating system patches for OSX and I'm at version 10.7.2.

Step 1 - Connect and prepare your external USB drive.

Connect your USB disk and open disk utility.
Change the formatting scheme of the disk to include two partitions, a 1GB partition, and a partition using the remaining disk space.  I named one as RECOVERY and one as TIMEMACHINE.  Ensure that under "Options" the format is GUID Partition

Select the format for both of the partitions as Mac OS Extended (HFS) and click apply. Note - this will erase all of the data from the selected drive so make sure you have the right drive selected.

Step 2 - Download and Install the OSX recovery disk assistant from Apple -
The wizard will ask you which disk you'd like to use to install onto.  Select the RECOVERY Volume.  Be aware that this will erase all data on the selected disk (well except for the TIMEMACHINE partition that we created earlier :)).
There is now a hidden recovery partition with a type of "Apple_Boot" on the USB drive that you used.  To see it, in a terminal window type:
diskutil list

Step 3 - Open Time Machine preferences and click select disk.  Select the TIMEMACHINE volume.  Also check off the encryption checkbox to ensure that your files are protected.  You will be prompted for a passphrase to use for this.  Note - this is a different passphrase than is used for the user on the computer and for the wholedisk encryption you have on the hard drive.

Step 4 - Wait until the first backup is complete.  Once the files are transfered for the first time the backups will be encrypted as well.  This also will take some time.  During these operations you can eject the disk and have it resume once the disk is reconnected.  When you reconnect the encrypted disk, you will be prompted for you password.

Step 5 - Once the backup and encryption operations are complete, you should test your backup solution by rebooting the computer and holding down the Option key, then select the USB disk.  The recovery wizard will walk you through the processes of restoring your computer from the recovery Volume on the USB drive.

I will update this post, when I get a chance to test out the recovery process.

Step 6 - Always remember the rule of 3 when making copies of your important data.  1 live copy, 1 backup copy, and 1 copy stored somewhere other than your other two.  In this case you could get by with just periodically (weekly / monthly) backing up to the USB drive and then storing this drive in a different location.

Monday, November 21

Announcing new team member - Benoit Desforges

I'm very pleased to announce that we've added another significant resource to our team.  Our new advisor Benoît Desforges brings international experience and a fresh perspective on information risk management.

Prior to joining, Benoît worked for KPMG's advisory group, he holds several professional designations including CISSP, CISA, GCIH, and GAWN.  When he's not teaching advanced networking courses for a local university, Benoît enjoys travel and time with his family.

Benoît will be providing our clients with security advice and building out a number of new and improved professional service offerings.  He'll also be regular contributor to our blog.  Congratulations Benoît!

Thursday, September 1

New Trust Solutions

With the all of the activity circling around SSL certs and CA trust, there is an inherent trust problem.  Internet users have been taught to trust the PKI scheme that we use for all secure browsing activity.  There are two very valid cases for the destruction of this trust:

1.  Law-enforcement / Government interception.  There are product vendors whose business model is to supply equipment to law enforcement and government clients which can "law-fully" intercept communications without the knowledge of the end-user.  Example is  Although I do not have a link (can anyone supply a corroborating link?), there are several product pages that are not publicly accessible which would likely confirm this fact.  In order for these products to work, the SSL certs that are used would have to be trusted by the browser software to avoid being detected as un-trusted.  I am theorizing that these certs would be generated by one of the trusted roots within the existing trust-model.

2.  Compromised CAs.  Both Comodo and Diginotar both purport to have been compromised resulting in the generation of certificates that can be used to emulate the trust with popular web properties.  To the end user there is no easy way to differentiate between valid and invalid certs.

The impact here is that a user may think that all information is secured between them and the server, but in reality this traffic may be routed through a very-untrusted 3rd party and intercepted.  We currently have no effective tool to provide information to users that any activity like this has occurred.  So for the mean time we should be very vigilant about who we are communicating with, and the certificates that are used to trust their identities.

I also encourage and hope that we see some innovative solutions created that will allow users to be aware of changes to traffic patterns - indicating potential MITM, and new methods of generating trust in web-services like convergence

Tuesday, August 30

Blindly Trusted Roots

With both Comodo and Diginotar both having their security breached, it highlights some of the important trust issues we have on the Internet.  The process of trusting these root CA's is extremely important as they serve as the foundation of protecting our information as it is transmitted across public and untrusted networks.

Both of the breaches resulted in fraudulent certifications being issued and used to impersonate high-traffic sites such as google, yahoo, skype and live dot com properties.  These certificates were used to trick browsers (and users) into thinking that they were connected to a valid site, when they were not.

More importantly though is the realization that the trust in the root CA system on the Internet has been eroded.  With two publicly disclosed breaches, how many undisclosed breaches have their been, and how many breaches of these CA's have not even been discovered?

While the use of fraudulent certificates on high-volume consumer sites is a big issue, the bigger issue here is the use of low-volume high-value certs to intercept financial transactions, email message systems, and other highly critical services.

My position is that we need to come up with a new paradigm for establishing trust in public/private services, and eliminate the use of old broken systems like the root CA pki's.  The only issue I see is the speed with which this can happen.

Friday, June 10

Application Security - Don't Wait for the Breach

The ongoing Sony saga, the Conservative Party, and now CodeMasters.  High-profile breaches of data are becoming everyday occurrences.   Reports like Verizon's DBIR indicate that more than 90% of these incidents would have been avoidable using basic security controls.  TripleCheck offers straight-forward assessment services to ensure that you're organization is prepared to meet these challenges.  Call or email us today to gain assurance over the security of your environment.

Thursday, May 19

May Security Catch-up

Its been much too long since my last post - Sony's PSN network has been breached a few times, a record number of vulnerabilities have been published, and the US government has released a new set of cyber space strategies.

On the cool tools and technologies there have been lots of notable releases:

  • Some research from Albert Cotesi New Zealand on the traffic flowing from IOS to 3rd parties, now sniffable thanks to MITMProxy, and instructions on getting it working with IOS
  • As always SQLmap is making life easier for the vulnerability assessor and pen-tester.
  • Microsoft has released an updated to the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit - I'll be looking into this over the next few weeks, and how it can be applied practically.
  • New major version of Backtrack also released, for those of you that are still relying upon live-cd's as a source for tools.

Thursday, March 17

RSA SecurID Information Breached

In a disclosure made by RSA today, they indicated that they have been breached by an "extremely sophisticated cyber attack" which has partially compromised the SecurID information which millions of clients use to provide strong authentication to services.

It is not yet clear what information was breached or what the impact will be to RSA customers, but for now I would suggest that people stay tuned to ensure that they take appropriate action based on what RSA and others release.

Update 1 - Found the recommendations made by RSA to customers regarding how to better protect their environments. I have added my comments on what these recommendations could mean to RSA.

• We recommend customers increase their focus on security for social media applications and the use of those applications and websites by anyone with access to their critical networks.

This could mean that part of the RSA breach was associated with a social media application attack vector - maybe employees reusing passwords across internal and cloud-based sites?

• We recommend customers enforce strong password and pin policies.

Could mean that the data that was compromised is related to the seed and token records kept by RSA, and with less reliance on this part of the SecurID solution, that customers must make the corresponding passwords and pins used in combination with the token more robust.

• We recommend customers follow the rule of least privilege when assigning roles and responsibilities to security administrators.

Could mean that the attack vector was related to additional privileges assigned to RSA security administration staff.

• We recommend customers re-educate employees on the importance of avoiding suspicious emails, and remind them not to provide user names or other credentials to anyone without verifying that person’s identity and authority. Employees should not comply with email or phone-based requests for credentials and should report any such attempts.

Could mean that social engineering was part of the attack vector, sounds very similar to the HBGary breach here.

• We recommend customers pay special attention to security around their active directories, making full use of their SIEM products and also implementing two-factor authentication to control access to active directories.

• We recommend customers watch closely for changes in user privilege levels and access rights using security monitoring technologies such as SIEM, and consider adding more levels of manual approval for those changes.

Could mean that users privileges were escalated as part of the attack, and that regular users were given privileges without any alerting of this fact.

• We recommend customers harden, closely monitor, and limit remote and physical access to infrastructure that is hosting critical security software.

Critical security software could mean the RSA intellectual information or customer information. Could also refer to the infrastructure.

• We recommend customers examine their help desk practices for information leakage that could help an attacker perform a social engineering attack.

Could mean that RSA staff were pre-texted, difficult to train out-sourced helpdesks.

• We recommend customers update their security products and the operating systems hosting them with the latest patches.

Could mean that the attack vector took advantage of previously known vulnerabilities with patches available but just not applied.

Hopefully we continue to hear more about the attack.

Thursday, February 17

Canada's Federal Government Targeted in "Cyberattack"

A couple of news outlets are reporting that a new attack which has resulted in unauthorized access to "highly classified federal information in two key departments".

There isn't much to the story at this point, other than it appears that some lock-down of Internet services has taken place at the affected agencies, and some analyst's reports seem to point the finger at China.

The real story here is that the storyline starts "An unprecedented cyberattack..." where it would appear by the details released so far, that this is simply another routine spear-fishing attack targeting a valued target.

Some of the scarce technical details regarding the attack include:

"The hackers apparently managed to take control of computers in the offices of senior government executives as part of a scheme to steal the key passwords.."

"Canadian government cybersecurity officials immediately shut down all internet access at the Finance Department and the Treasury Board, in an attempt to stop stolen information from being sent back to the hackers over the net."

"The hackers, then posing as the federal executives, sent emails to departmental technical staffers, conning them into providing key passwords unlocking access to government networks."

"The program hunts for specific kinds of classified government information, and sends it back to the hackers over the internet"

I'll be interested and will post on the technical details of the attack when we know more, and also comment on how these types of attacks can be prevented in the first place.

The other interesting part of this, is that the federal government is not forth-coming regarding the details of the attack, the impact, or what controls are going to prevent and detect these things from happening again.

Thursday, January 27

Microsoft Attack Surface Analyzer - Review

As part of their involvement at the Black Hat security conference in virginia the microsoft security team has released a new beta of a tool to assist security analysts in understanding the security impacts and effects that result from installation of software that performs unknown installation features.

The Attack Surface Analyzer or ASA for short is based on a slightly dated, but still very relevant Carnegie Mellon paper on measuring attack surfaces - link.  The beta product implements a few of the methodologies discussed by creating baselines of system information before and after the installation of the target software, then analyzing the differences noted and providing an analysis based on a predefined set of security properties (set by Microsoft).

This approach is not new, however Microsoft's product makes the work of baselining, analyzing and reporting extremely easy, with a easy to read browser readable report generated for the analyst.

I decided to test this tool out with software that I had not previously installed to see what kind of value this could bring to the average security analyst.  The Google Cloud Connect for Microsoft Office is a new product that allows Google Apps collaboration within the Microsoft Office product suite.  Shouldn't be any security impacts from this combination right?

After installing the ASA tool itself and running it from the icon installed in the Windows 7 start menu.  The interface prompts the analyst to run the initial baseline scan and save the results to a .cab file.

The tool provides a progress report as it collects the information about your system.  This includes all of the expected types of data that this type of comparison would use.  It does take a few minutes as it includes scans of both the filesystem and registry.

With both baselines recorded now we generate a report by comparing the baseline scan with the post installation scan.  This is useful as you can create multiple scans with different installation options and compare them to each other and to the original baseline to determine what changes are made.

The resulting HTML (and javascript) report provides three tabs, the first summarizing the conditions of the analysis and tombstone information regarding the versions of tools, OS, etc.

There is a tab that summarizes the details of the security issues, and includes helpful explanations of each of the issues if you aren't already familiar with them.  In Google Cloud Connect's case, there were three security issues reported:
  • Directories With Weak ACLs - related to the use of NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller (needs more investigation to see why this was reported)
  • Processes With NX Disabled - GoogleCrashHandler.exe included in the software does not use DEP security options (why not?)
  • Services Vulnerable To Tampering - The Google Update service that was installed is also susceptible to tampering by the NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller account.

The Attack Surface tab describes each of the areas assessed in which changes were introduced and details regarding what changed in each area.  This is the most valuable component to me as it describes the specific changes to the operating environment that resulted from the installation of the software.

In our case here is what the Google Cloud Connect software changed:
  • New Service - Google Update Service
  • New Running Processes - google crash handler and a .NET framework utility
  • 113 New Registered COM Controls - IE mostly but controls used within the software.
  • 3 New Internet Explorer Silent Elevation Entries / Preapproved controls - Google Update plugin - This is interesting as it looks like this gets added to the list of approved protected mode controls - more investigation needed here.
  • 1 New TCP Port - Established outbound TCP port on 49336.  This is likely the port used by the google update service and checks for updates during the install.  Not sure more investigation likely here as well.
  • 6 New Named Pipes

Overall this tool is extremely helpful in understanding the changes made to the Windows OS environment from the installation of software.  It will detect things like new services being installed, such as the google update service that you might not have realized was being installed.  I recommend using ASA to analyze software that you intend to install and make sure you know what you're installing and what effect different installation options have.

Thursday, January 20

Business Browsing Insecurity

Just finished my talk on browser insecurity for the Calgary ISACA chapter.  Thank you to those who attended.  The intention of the topic isn't to scare people, but to help inform those that only hear from vendor's regularly regarding the state of their controls.

Here is a link to the presentation in both pdf (with speaking notes) and the ppt formats.

PDF Presentation
PPT Presentation

If anyone wants to continue any of the discussions we had afterward please feel free to email or call me.

Wednesday, January 5

PCI-DSS Version 2.0 - Standard Effective

If you've stayed connected to the PCI-DSS world, you'll know that version 2.0 of the standard was released late last year.  As of January 1st, 2011 stage 2 has begun, which means the standard becomes effective.  Which unfortunately only means that stakeholders (merchants, processors, etc) should start using the new standard and not the old, not that the standard provides effective security (that would be nice if you could just announce that kind of thing).  Here is a link to the standard's lifecycle to make this more clear.

Keep in mind that you can still use the old standard for compliance reporting for 14 months, but if the new standard is available, its likely a good idea to get a handle on the changes and how they'll affect your compliance program.

Monday, January 3

Encryption Fails - Embedded SSL Keys - PS3 root keys

A couple of noteworthy failures in the implementations of encryption.

The littleblackbox project over at google code aims to provide a list of all of the private keys embedded into device firmware by vendors that are too lazy to create unique private keys for devices.  This includes consumer devices, some commercial devices, basically anything that has a private key embedded in common firmware shipped with the device.  Once you have the private keys you can then decrypt future communications from the devices (read: admin interface traffic, SSL vpn session negotiation, etc).

This affects lots of products and software including many of the popular dd-wrt devices.

Want to add to the list of recognized private keys, simply download the binwalk tool and feed it a firmware file from your device.

It also appears that the root encryption key from Sony's PS3 game console has been discovered and posted by Geohot on his site.  Here is a video from fail0verflow's explanation of the weaknesses in the PS3 security model.

Google's Michael Z Releases a Contentious New Tool - cross_fuzz

Lcamtuf or Michael Zalewski has released a tool to test browsers for security issues by parsing the DOM object model, injecting values into a large number of objects, and triggering garbage collection by destroying the created objects.  A more detailed explanation of the tool and how it works can be found here:

The interesting part is that Microsoft had previously asked to have the tool's release delayed due to an un-patched vulnerability discovered in the IE browser, exploitable on XP.  Michael declined to delay the release stating that he had reason to believe that possibly nefarious individuals were aware of the bug, and may be exploiting it in the wild.

Some commentary over at Slashdot here

Interesting start to 2011!